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Abstract—Language-based information-flow control (IFC)
techniques often rely on special purpose, ad-hoc primitives to
address different covert channels that originate in the runtime
system, beyond the scope of language constructs. Since these
piecemeal solutions may not compose securely, there is a need
for a unified mechanism to control covert channels. As a first
step towards this goal, we argue for the design of a general
interface that allows programs to safely interact with the runtime
system and the available computing resources. To coordinate the
communication between programs and the runtime system, we
propose the use of asynchronous exceptions (interrupts), which, to
the best of our knowledge, have not been considered before in the
context of IFC languages. Since asynchronous exceptions can be
raised at any point during execution—often due to the occurrence
of an external event—threads must temporarily mask them out
when manipulating locks and shared data structures to avoid
deadlocks and, therefore, breaking program invariants. Crucially,
the naive combination of asynchronous exceptions with existing
features of IFC languages (e.g., concurrency and synchronization
variables) may open up new possibilities of information leakage.
In this paper, we present MACasync, a concurrent, statically
enforced IFC language that, as a novelty, features asynchronous
exceptions. We show how asynchronous exceptions easily enable
(out of the box) useful programming patterns like speculative ex-
ecution and some degree of resource management. We prove that
programs in MACasync satisfy progress-sensitive non-interference
and mechanize our formal claims in the Agda proof assistant.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-Flow Control [1] (IFC) is a promising approach
for preserving confidentiality of data. It tracks how data of
different sensitivity levels (e.g., public or sensitive) flows within
a program, and raises alarms when confidentiality might be
at stake. This technology has been previously used to secure
operating systems (e.g., [2, 3]), web browsers (e.g., [4, 5]),
and several programming languages (e.g., [6, 7, 8]).
Most language-based approaches for IFC reason about
constructions found in programs (e.g., variables, branches,
and data structures), while often ignoring aspects of runtime
systems which might create covert channels (e.g., [9, 10, 11])
capable of producing leaks, e.g., through caches, parallelism,
resource usage, etc. To deal with this problem, researchers
have proposed security-aware runtime system designs [11, 12].
However, building runtime systems is a major endeavour and
these proposals have yet to be implemented. A more lightweight
approach to securing runtime systems relies on special-purpose
language constructs that coordinate the execution of programs
with different components of the runtime—e.g., the garbage-
collector [10], the scheduler [13], timeouts [14], lazy evaluation
[15] and caches [16].1 While a step in the right direction,
designing ad-hoc constructs every time that some coordination
with the runtime system is needed feels rather unsatisfactory—
an observation that has also been made outside the security
arena [17, 18, 19]. In fact, implementing hooks in an existing
runtime system requires specific knowledge of its internals
and considerable expertise. Even worse, the composition of
piecemeal security solutions may weaken or even break the
security guarantees of the runtime system as a whole. These
issues suggest the need for a unified mechanism to close covert
channels in the runtime system. As a first step towards this
goal, we believe that runtime systems should expose a general
IFC-aware interface that allow IFC languages to systematically
control and secure components of the runtime system. How
should programs coordinate with the runtime system through
this interface?
In the 70s, Unix-like operating systems conceived signals as
a limited form of inter process communication (IPC).2 Signals
are no more than asynchronous notifications sent to processes
in order to notify them of the occurrence of events, where
the origin of signals is either the kernel or other processes.
Furthermore, when receiving a signal, process execution can
be interrupted during any non-atomic instruction—and if the
process has previously registered a signal handler, then that
routine gets executed. If we think of the kernel as “the runtime”
and of processes as our “programs”, signals are exactly the
mechanism needed to implement the interface that we need!
In fact, and generally speaking, the idea of OS-signals have
been already internalized by programming languages in the
form of asynchronous exceptions.
Asynchronous exceptions are raised as a result of external
events and can occur at any point of the program. As a result,
they are considered so difficult to master that many languages
(e.g., Python [20] and Java [21]) either restrict or completely
forbid programmers from using them. The main reason is that
interrupting a program at any point might break, for instance, a
data-structure invariant or result in holding a lock indefinitely—
and it is not that clear how to get out of such situation.
Despite not being widely adopted in its full expressive power,
asynchronous exceptions enable very useful programming
patterns: speculative execution (i.e., a thread can spawn a
child thread and later decide that it does not need the result




and kill it), timeouts, and resource management. We argue that
such patterns are desirable to have in any modern IFC system.
Our contributions
In this work, we present MACasync, a Haskell IFC library
that extends the concurrent version of MAC [22, 23] with
asynchronous exception. We formally prove progress-sensitive
non-interference (PSNI) [24] for MACasync and provide mech-
anized proofs in Agda [25] of all our claims as supplementary
material to this work. We believe that the extension presented
in this paper and its formal security guarantees extend to other
Haskell IFC libraries (e.g., LIO [26]).
The semantics for asynchronous exceptions in MACasync is
inspired by how asynchronous exception are modeled in Haskell
[27]—where a mechanism of masking/unmasking marks regions
of code where asynchronous exceptions can be safely raised.
However, allowing untrusted code to mask exceptions arbi-
trarily poses other security risks. For example, a rouge thread
could abuse the masking mechanism to exhaust all available
computing resources and starve other threads in the system
without the risk of being terminated. To avoid that, we propose a
fine-grained (selective) masking/unmasking mechanism instead
of the traditional all-or-nothing approaches, which disable all
asynchronous exceptions inside handlers [28, 29]. Furthermore,
in contrast with [27], our design forbids raising multiple
exceptions at the same time, which, we believe, can too easily
disrupt programs in unpredictable ways. While an exception
is raised, our language does not raise incoming exceptions,
which are, instead, stored in a queue of pending exceptions
and raised only when the current one has been handled.
From the security perspective, asynchronous exceptions
follow the no write-down security check for IFC: when
throwing an asynchronous exception, the security level of
the source thread should flow to the security level of the
recipient. The caveats are, however, in the formalization of
masking/unmasking mechanisms and the (progress-sensitive)
non-interference proof. For example, it is important for security
that asynchronous exception are deterministically inserted into
the queue of pending exceptions. We utilize term erasure
as the proof technique and leverage double-step erasure to
deal with the complexity of our semantics (i.e., concurrency,
synchronization variables and asynchronous exceptions), like
in previous existing work (e.g., [23, 30, 31]).
In summary, our list of contributions includes:
I An extension to MAC, called MACasync, to handle IFC-
aware asynchronous exceptions in the presence of concurrency.
I Formal semantics, enforcement, and progress-sensitive non-
interference guarantees for MACasync.
I Mechanized proofs of all our claims in approximately 3,000
lines of Agda3.
I We showcase MACasync and the new programming patterns
enabled by asynchronous exceptions with two examples, in
which we implement secure versions of (i) a speculative
3Available at https://bitbucket.org/carlostome/mac-async.
-- Abstract types
data Labeled ` τ
data MAC ` τ
-- Monadic structure for computations
instance Monad (MAC `)
-- Core operations
label :: `L v `H ⇒ τ → MAC `L (Labeled `H τ)
unlabel :: `L v `H ⇒ Labeled `L τ → MAC `H τ
Fig. 1: Core API for MAC.
execution combinator, and (ii) a load-balancing controller for
sensitive worker threads, respectively.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first account
for asynchronous exceptions in concurrent IFC-systems. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we revisit
MAC’s API. Section III presents MACasync by example. In
Section IV, we extend MAC’s semantics to track asynchronous
exceptions. In Section V, we introduce asynchronous exceptions
and the masking/unmasking mechanisms. Section VI presents
our security guarantees. Section VII describes related work
and Section VIII concludes.
II. THE MAC IFC LIBRARY
To help readers get familiar with the MAC IFC library [22],
we give a brief overview of its API and programming model.
a) Security Lattice: The information flow policies en-
forced by MAC are specified by a security lattice [32], which
defines a partial order between security levels (labels). These
labels represent the sensitivity of program inputs and outputs
and the order between them dictates which flows of information
are allowed in a program. For example, the classic two-point
lattice L = ({L,H },v) classifies data as either public (L) or
secret (H ) and only prohibits sending secret inputs into public
outputs, i.e., H 6v L. In MAC, the security lattice is embedded
in Haskell using standard features of the type-system [22]. In
particular, each security label is represented by an abstract data-
type and valid flows of information (the v-relation between
labels) are encoded using type-class constructs.
b) Security Types: MAC enforces security statically by
means of special types annotated with security labels. The
abstract type Labeled ` τ associates label ` with data of type
τ . For example, pwd :: Labeled H String is a secret string
and score :: Labeled L Int is a public integer. The abstract
type MAC ` τ represents a side-effecful computation that
manipulates data labeled with ` and whose result has type
τ . MAC provides a monadic interface to help programmers
write secure code. The basic primitives of the interface are
return and bind (written as the infix operator >>=). Primitive
return :: τ → MAC ` τ creates a computation that simply
returns a value of type τ without causing side-effects. Primitive
(>>=) :: MAC ` τ1 → (τ1 → MAC ` τ2)→ MAC ` τ2 chains
two computations (at the same security level `) together, in
a sequence. Specifically, program m >>= f takes the result
obtained by executing m and binds it to function f , which
fork :: `L v `H ⇒ MAC `H ()→ MAC `L ()
data MVar ` τ
newMVar :: `L v `H ⇒ τ → MAC `L (MVar `H τ)
putMVar :: MVar ` τ → τ → MAC ` ()
takeMVar :: MVar ` τ → MAC ` τ
Fig. 2: Concurrent API for MAC.
produces the rest of the computation. Our examples use do-
notation, Haskell syntactic sugar for monadic computations.
For instance, we write do x ← m; return (x + 1) for the
program m >>= λx → return (x + 1), which increments by
one the result returned by m .
c) Flows of information: In order to enforce information
flow policies, MAC regulates the interaction between MAC
computations and Labeled data. Computations cannot write and
read labeled data directly, but must use special functions label
and unlabel (Fig. 1). These functions create and read labeled
data as long as these operations comply with specific security
rules, known as no write-down and no read-up [33]. Intuitively,
function label writes some data into a fresh, `H-labeled value
as long as the decision to do so depends on less sensitive data,
i.e., the computation is labeled with `L such that `L v `H.
(To help readers, we use subscripts in metavariables `L and `H
to indicate that `L v `H). Dually, function unlabel allows `H-
labeled computations to read data from lower security levels,
i.e., data labeled with `L such that `L v `H. In the type-
signatures of these functions, the precondition `L v `H is a
type(-class) constraint, which must be statically satisfied when
type-checking programs. As a result, programs that attempt
to leak secret data, e.g., via implicit flows, are ill-typed and
rejected by the compiler. In particular, programs cannot branch
on secret H -labeled data directly, but must use unlabel first
to extract its content. Once unlabeled, secret data can only
be manipulated within a computation labeled with H thanks
to the type of unlabel and bind. Then, trying to use function
label to create public L-labeled data triggers a type error that
represents a violation of the no write-down rule. Specifically,
an attempt to create public data from within a secret context
generates an unsatisfiable type constraint H v L, arising
from the use of label .
MAC incorporates other kinds of resources (e.g., references
and network sockets) in a similar way. Resources are encap-
sulated in labeled resources handlers and the API exposed to
labeled computations is designed so that the read and write
side-effects of each operation respect the no read-up and no
write-down rules.
d) Concurrency: Extending IFC languages with concur-
rency is a delicate task because threads provide attackers with
new means to leak data. For example, the possibility of execut-
ing computations concurrently magnifies the bandwidth of the
termination covert channel [34]. This channel enables brute
force attacks in which threads try to guess the secret and enter
into a loop to suppress public outputs if they succeed. Even
worse, the combination of concurrency and shared resources
can introduce subtle internal-timing channels [35]. This covert
channel is exploited by attacks that influence the (public)
outcome of data races with secret data [9, 34]. To support
concurrency securely, MAC: (i) decouples computations that
manipulate secret data from computations that can generate
public outputs, and (ii) prevents threads (labeled computations)
from affecting data races between threads at lower security
levels. Primitive fork (Fig. 2) allows a `L-labeled computation
to fork a thread at a higher security level, i.e., labeled with
`H such that `L v `H. Intuitively, forking constitutes a write
operation and thus the type of fork enforces the no write-
down rule. MAC does not implements threads directly, but
relies on Haskell green (lightweight user-level) threads. These
threads are managed by the GHC runtime system running a
round-robin scheduler, which is compatible with the security
guarantees of MAC [23, 30].
e) Synchronization Variables: MAC supports shared
mutable state in the form of synchronization variables, fol-
lowing the style of Concurrent Haskell [36]. The abstract
type MVar ` τ (Fig. 2) represents a synchronization variable
that can be either empty or full with a value of type τ at
security level `. Threads can create and atomically access
synchronization variables with functions newMVar , putMVar
and takeMVar . Function newMVar creates a synchronization
variable initially full with the given value. (Like label and
fork, function newMVar performs a write side-effect, thus
its type signature has a similar security check). Functions
putMVar and takeMVar allow threads to write and read
shared variables synchronously. In particular, these functions
block threads trying to read or write variables in the wrong
“state”. For example, function putMVar writes a value into
an empty variable and blocks the thread if the variable is
full. Dually, function takeMVar empties a full variable and
returns its content and blocks the caller otherwise. Notice
that putMVar and takeMVar perform both read and write
side-effects: they must always read the variable to determine
whether the caller should be blocked. Then, the no read-up
and no write-down security rules imply that these functions
are secure only when they operate within the same security
level, i.e., both the variable and the computation are labeled
with ` [22].
III. MACasync BY EXAMPLE
Asynchronous exceptions enable useful programming pat-
terns that, to our knowledge, cannot be coded securely in any
existing IFC language. We illustrate some of these idioms
in MACasync, which extends MAC with three new primitives
throwTo, mask (unmask ), and catch . These primitives allow
threads to (1) send signals to threads at higher security
levels by throwing exceptions asynchronously, (2) suppress
(enable) exceptions in specific regions of code, and (3) react
to exceptions by running their corresponding exception handler,
respectively.
Example 1 (Speculative execution). Imagine two implemen-
tations of the same algorithm whose performance depends
on the input. Instead of settling for one, we could run both
concurrently and just return the output of the first that finishes.
At that point the thread computing the other algorithm may be
killed since its result is no longer necessary. We can implement
such a combinator for speculative execution in MACasync using
asynchronous exceptions. First, we declare Kill :: Exception
as a new exception, and define kill t , a function that sends
exception Kill asynchronously to the thread identified by t .4
1 data Exception = Kill | ...
2 kill t = throwTo t Kill
Then, we define the combinator speculate , which receives two
computations c1 and c2 to run speculatively.
3 speculate :: MAC ` a → MAC ` a → MAC ` a
4 speculate c1 c2 = do
5 m ← newEmptyMVar
6 t1 ← fork (c1 >>= putMVar m)
7 t2 ← fork (c2 >>= putMVar m)
8 r ← takeMVar m
9 kill t1; kill t2
10 return r
The combinator creates an empty synchronization variable m
(line 5) and forks two threads (6–7), which run computations c1
and c2 concurrently and then write the result to m . When the
combinator reads variable m (8), it blocks until either thread
terminates and fills it with the result. When this happens, the
combinator resumes, kills the children threads (one may still
be running) (9), and returns the result (10).
Example 2 (Thread pool). This example presents the code of
a controller thread that maintains a pool of worker threads
to perform computations on a stream of incoming (sensitive)
inputs. In this scheme, the controller thread manages the worker
threads in the pool by reacting to asynchronous exceptions sent
by other (public and secret) threads in the system. For example,
when some secret input becomes available, a thread can send
an exception InputH secret to the controller thread, which
extracts the secret data and forwards it to the first available
worker thread to process it. Similarly, when the thread pool
is no longer needed, it can be deallocated by sending the
exception Kill to the controller, which then kills each worker
thread in the pool. In the same way, the controller could be
programmed to react to specific exceptions and carry out even
more tasks (e.g., dynamically resizing the thread pool).
To set up this scheme, a thread calls function initTP (Fig. 3)
to initialize the thread pool and start the controller thread.
Function initTP n f allocates an empty synchronization
variable m (line 6), forks a pool of n worker threads executing
function f (line 7), collects their identifiers ts , and passes it to
the controller thread (line 8). As new input becomes available,
the controller writes it to the shared variable m , which is
then read by one of the workers and its content processed
4In MACasync, primitive fork returns the identifier of the child thread to
the parent.
1 type Data = ...
2 data Exception = Kill | Input` (Labeled ` Data) | ...
3 type Size = Int
4 initTP :: Size → (Data → MAC H ())→ MAC L (TId H )
5 initTP n f = do
6 m ← newEmptyMVar
7 ts ← forM [1 . .n ] (λ → fork (worker f m))
8 fork (controller ts m)
9 worker :: (Data → MAC H ())→ MVar H Data → MAC H ()
10 worker f m = do
11 mask [Kill ] (takeMVar m >>= f )
12 worker f m
13 controller :: [TId H ]→ MVar H Data → MAC H ()
14 controller ts m =
15 let wait = newEmptyMVar >>= takeMVar in
16 catch wait
17 [ (InputH secret ,
18 mask [InputH ,Kill ]
19 (do s← unlabel secret
20 putMVar m s
21 unmask [InputH ,Kill ] (controller ts m)))
22 , (Kill ,
23 mask [InputH ,Kill ] (forM ts kill)) ]
Fig. 3: Thread pool example.
via function f (line 11). To avoid getting killed in the middle
of a computation, worker threads mask exception Kill while
processing data, thus ensuring that they always complete on-
going computations without aborting prematurely. It may seem
erroneous to mask also instruction takeMVar : can this cause
a worker thread to block indefinitely waiting for new input?
No, in Concurrent Haskell, and MACasync, operations that can
block indefinitely (like takeMVar ) are interruptible, i.e., they
can receive and raise asynchronous exceptions even in masked
blocks [27].
Function controller ts m implements a controller thread
for the thread pool ts sharing variable m . As long as it
receives no exception, the controller thread simply waits
on an always-empty synchronization variable via wait (line
15). When the thread receives an exception, it resumes and
executes the corresponding code in the list of exception
handlers. In particular, when new secret input becomes available
(InputH secret), it unlabels the secret (line 19) and writes it
to variable m (line 20), so that the worker threads can process
it. Notice that if variable m is full at this point, then some
previous input is still waiting to be processed (all workers
threads are busy) and the controller just waits on the variable.
As soon as a worker thread completes, it empties the variable
containing the pending input, and the controller resumes by
writing the variable; then it continues to wait for further
exceptions. To avoid dropping any input, the controller thread
masks exceptions Kill and InputH (line 18) while processing
requests. For example, if exceptions were not properly masked
in that block of code, the controller could receive an exception,
e.g., Kill , which would terminate the thread while trying to
feed the last input received to the workers. Once done, the
controller unmasks the exceptions again (line 21) and continues
to wait for new input. After receiving and eventually raising
the exception Kill , the controller thread propagates it to all the
workers in the pool (line 23) and then terminates. Also in this
case, the controller thread masks the other exceptions, which
could otherwise prematurely terminate the controller and leave
some of the worker threads alive.
The example, however, has a catch! Primitive putMVar may
also block the controller indefinitely like takeMVar , and thus
may likewise be interrupted and raise an exception, even if that
exception is masked. As a result, the controller thread could
also be interrupted on line 20 and drop the current input. To fix
the program, we introduce the combinator retry killed m ss ,
which repeatedly attempts to fill variable m with the inputs
pending in list ss while handling other exceptions.
24 retry :: Bool → [TId H ]→ MVar H Data
25 → [Data ]→ MAC H ()
26 retry killed ts m [ ] =
27 if killed then forM ts kill ; exit else return ()
28 retry killed m (s : ss) =
29 catch (putMVar m s)
30 [ (InputH secret ,
31 do s ′ ← unlabel secret
32 if killed
33 then retry killed ts m (s : ss)
34 else retry killed ts m ((s : ss) ++ [s ′ ])
35 , (Kill , retry True ts m (s : ss)) ]
If further inputs are received while executing retry , the
function appends them to list ss to avoid dropping them, and
thus ensuring that they will eventually be delivered to the
workers. If the controller receives exception Kill while retrying,
the boolean flag killed is switched on and further inputs are
discarded. In this case, when all the inputs received before
Kill are dispatched, the controller kills the worker threads and
terminates with exit (line 27)—the function retry assumes
exceptions Input H and Kill are masked so this operation
will not be interrupted. In conclusion, to repair the code of
controller , we simply replace putMVar m s (line 20) with
retry False ts m [s].
Even though relatively simple, these examples cannot be
coded in IFC languages without support for asynchronous
communication like MAC. In these languages, synchronous
primitives (e.g., MVar ) must be restricted to operate within
a single security level for security reasons, as explained
in Section II and [23]. For instance, if only synchronous
communication was available, then the controller thread from
our second example could not receive commands from public
(L-labeled) threads.5
5In MAC, a public thread could technically communicate asynchronously
with a secret thread by updating a secret, mutable reference. However, these
labeled references would inevitably introduce serious data races and thus do
not represent a viable alternative.
Types: τ ::= () | Bool | τ1 → τ2
Values: v ::= () | True | False | λx .t
Terms: t ::= t1 t2 | if t then t1 else t2 | v
Fig. 4: Core syntax.
Types: τ ::= · · · | MAC ` τ | Labeled ` τ
Values: v ::= · · · | Labeled t | return t
Terms: t ::= · · · | label t | unlabel t | t1 >>= t2
(UNLABEL1)
t1  t2
unlabel t1 −−−→ unlabel t2
(UNLABEL2)
unlabel (Labeled t) −−−→ return t
Fig. 5: Syntax and semantics of MACasync (excerpts).
IV. FORMAL SEMANTICS
A. Core of MACasync
From a security perspective, the interaction between syn-
chronization variables, asynchronous exceptions, and exception
masking is a delicate matter. MACasync implements these
primitives on top of those provided by Concurrent Haskell,
whose runtime is not designed with security in mind. For
example, the fact that a thread may be able to resume another
by sending an asynchronous exception [27] (as explained in the
second example above) may introduce subtle internal timing
covert channels that weaken the security guarantees of MAC.
To rule that out, we extend the small-step semantics of MAC
from [23] with asynchronous exceptions and perform a rigorous,
comprehensive security analysis of the whole language.
The core of MACasync is the standard call-by-name λ-
calculus with boolean and unit type (Fig. 4). We specify the
side-effect free semantics of the core λ-calculus (e.g., function
abstraction, application) as a small-step reduction relation,
t1  t2, which denotes that term t1 reduces in one step to t2.
These reduction rules are standard and we completely omit
them in this presentation.
The defining feature of MACasync is the security monad
MAC , which encapsulates computations that may produce side-
effects. Figure 5 specifies the syntax and part of the semantics
for the side-effectful constructs of the language. The small-step
relation t1 −→ t2 denotes a single sequential step that brings
term t1 of type MAC ` τ to t2. Rule (UNLABEL1) reduces term
unlabel t1 to unlabel t2 by evaluating the argument through a
pure semantics step t1  t2. When the argument is evaluated,
rule (UNLABEL2) extracts the content of the labeled value and
returns it in the security monad.
B. Synchronization Variables
Figure 6 extends MACasync with synchronization variables.
The store Σ is partitioned by label into separate memory
segments S , each consisting of a list of memory cells c, which
can be either full with a term (L t M) or empty (⊗). A value
Store: Σ ∈ Label → Memory
Memory: S ::= [ ] | c : S
Cell: c ::=⊗ | L t M
Addresses: n ∈ N
Types: τ ::= · · · | MVar ` τ
Values: v ::= · · · | MVar ` n
Terms: t ::= · · · | newMVar ` t | takeMVar t
| putMVar t1 t2
(NEW)
n = |Σ(`)|





Σ, putMVar t1 t2 −−−→ Σ, putMVar t ′1 t2
(PUT2)
(`,n) 7→ ⊗ ∈ Σ Σ′ = Σ[(`,n) 7→ L t M]
Σ, putMVar (MVar ` n) t −−−→ Σ′, return ()
Fig. 6: Syntax and semantics for synchronization variables.
MVar ` n denotes a synchronization variable that refers to the
n-th cell of the `-labeled memory segment in the store.6
In rule (NEW), primitive newMVar ` t allocates a new
memory cell containing term t in the `-labeled segment of the
store, at fresh address n = |Σ(`)|, i.e., Σ[(`,n) 7→ L t M], and
returns the corresponding synchronization variable MVar ` n .
Term putMVar ` t1 t2 writes term t2 into the empty cell pointed
by the synchronization variable t1. To do that, rule (PUT1)
starts evaluating the variable t1 through a pure semantics step
t1  t ′1. When the variable is fully evaluated, e.g., MVar ` n ,
rule (PUT2) takes over and writes the given term t in the
cell identified by (`,n), i.e., Σ[(`,n) 7→ L t M]. Notice that the
term steps only if the cell in the store Σ is initially empty,
i.e., (`,n) 7→ ⊗ ∈ Σ. If the cell is full, the term cannot
be reduced by any other rule of the semantics and gets stuck,
capturing the intended blocking behavior of synchronization
variables. We omit the rules for takeMVar , which follow a
similar pattern [23].
C. Concurrency
Unlike previous concurrent incarnations of MAC, threads in
MACasync can communicate with each other by sending signals
in the form of asynchronous exceptions. To enable this form
of communication, the runtime system assigns a unique thread
identifier to each thread of the system. Thread identifiers are
opaque to avoid leaking secret data through the number of
threads in the system, and labeled to prevent sensitive threads
from sending exceptions to threads at lower security levels.
MACasync incorporates thread identifiers with values TId` n of
the new primitive type TId `, whose label ` represents the static
security level of the thread identified by n . Thread identifiers
6Some terms in the calculus carry a label annotation that is inferred from its
type. For example, the label ` in MVar` n comes from its type MVar ` τ .
Events: e ::= step | fork`(t)
Thread Id: n ∈ N
Thread Id Map φ ∈ Label → Thread Id
Types: τ ::= · · · | TId `
Values: v ::= · · · | TId` n




fork`(t)−−−−−→φ Σ, return (TId` n)
Fig. 7: Syntax and semantics of fork.
are also unforgeable and only generated automatically by the
runtime system each time a new thread is forked.
fork :: `L v `H ⇒ MAC `H ()→ MAC `L (TId `H)
Figure 7 extends the sequential calculus of MACasync with
concurrency primitives. To simplify our security analysis, term
fork` t is annotated with the security label ` of thread t of
type MAC ` (). Similarly to [23], we decorate the sequential
reduction relation from above with events, which inform the
top-level scheduler of the execution of sequential commands
that have global effects. For example, event fork`(t) indicates
that thread t at security level ` has been forked and event step
denotes an uninteresting (silent) sequential step. Later, we
extend the category of events to keep track of asynchronous
exceptions as well. Sequential steps are also parameterized
by a thread id map φ, which represents a source of fresh
thread identifiers for each security level. The use of this map is
exemplified by rule (FORK). Whenever a new thread is forked,
e.g., fork` t , we use the label annotation ` to generate a
fresh identifier n = φ(`), which is then returned in the monad
wrapped in the constructor of thread identifiers, i.e., TId` n .
Figure 8 introduces the top-level semantics relation that
formalizes how concurrent configurations evolve. Concurrent
configurations are pairs 〈Σ,Θ〉 consisting of the concurrent
store Σ and a map of thread pools Θ. The thread pool map
Θ maps each label of the lattice to the list of threads Ts
at that security level, currently in the system. Each rule
of the concurrent semantics constructs the source of fresh
thread identifiers φ from the thread pool map Θ of the initial
configuration by means of the function nextId(Θ) = λ`.|Θ(`)|.
A concurrent step `,n ` c1 ↪→ c2 indicates that
configuration c1 steps to c2, while running the thread identified
(`,n), i.e., the n-th thread of the `-labeled thread pool. The
particular scheduler used to determine which thread runs at
every step is not very relevant for our discussion, therefore
we omit it in our semantics. It suffices to say that the
security guarantees of MACasync carry over for a wide range of
deterministic schedulers [23] (as witnessed by our mechanized
proofs) and include the Round Robin scheduler adopted in
Concurrent Haskell. The concurrent rules rely on sequential
events to determine which step to take. For example, rule
(SEQ) extracts the running thread from the thread pool, i.e.,
Θ[(`,n) 7→ t1], which steps silently, i.e., generating event
Configuration: C ::= 〈Σ,Θ〉
Thread Pool Map: Θ ∈ Label → Thread Pool
Thread Pool: Ts ::= [ ] | (th, Ts)
Thread State: th ::= t
(SEQ)
φ = nextId(Θ) Σ1, t1
step−−−→φ Σ2, t2
`,n ` 〈Σ1,Θ[(`,n) 7→ t1]〉 ↪→ 〈Σ2,Θ[(`,n) 7→ t2]〉
(FORK)
φ = nextId(Θ1) n
′ = φ(`′)
Θ2 = Θ1[(`,n) 7→ t2] Σ, t1
fork`′ (t)−−−−−−→φ Σ, t2
`,n ` 〈Σ,Θ1[(`,n) 7→ t1]〉 ↪→ 〈Σ,Θ2[(`′,n ′) 7→ t ]〉
Fig. 8: Syntax and semantics of concurrent MACasync.
throwTo :: `L v `H ⇒ TId `H → χ→ MAC `L ()
catch :: MAC ` τ → [(χ,MAC ` τ)]→ MAC ` τ
Fig. 9: MACasync API for asynchronous exceptions.
step, and thus the rule only reinserts the thread term in the
thread pool, i.e., Θ[(`,n) 7→ t2]. In contrast, event fork`′(t)
in rule (FORK) indicates that the running thread has forked,
therefore the rule reinserts the parent thread in the pool,
i.e., Θ2 = Θ1[(`,n) 7→ t2], and also adds its child at the
corresponding security level `′ and fresh index n ′ = φ(`′), i.e.,
Θ2[(`
′,n ′) 7→ t ].
V. ASYNCHRONOUS EXCEPTIONS
MACasync supports sending and handling asynchronous
exceptions by means of two new primitives throwTo and catch ,
see Figure 9. Primitive throwTo t ξ raises the exception ξ of
abstract type χ asynchronously in the thread with identifier t .
Intuitively, this operation constitutes a write effect, therefore
MACasync restricts its API according to the no write-down
rule to enforce security. To this end, the API ensures that
the security label of the receiver thread (`H) is at least as
sensitive as the label of the sender (`L) through the type
constraint `L v `H. Once delivered and raised, asynchronous
exceptions behave like synchronous exceptions. They disrupt
the execution of the receiving thread in the usual way, with the
exception bubbling up in the code of the thread and, if uncaught,
eventually crashing it. Threads can recover from exceptions
by wrapping regions of code in a catch block. The same
mechanism, allows threads to react to asynchronous signals by
handling exceptions appropriately. Primitive catch t hs takes
as a parameter a computation t and a list containing pairs
of exceptions and handlers. Then, if an exception ξ is raised
during the execution of t , the handler corresponding to the
first exception matching ξ in the list hs , if there is one, gets
executed.
Figure 10 extends the calculus with value raise ξ, which
indicates that the computation is in an exceptional state, and
a new event throw`(ξ,n), which instructs the runtime to
deliver exception ξ to the thread identified by (`,n). To model
how asynchronous exceptions propagate precisely, we add
new rules both to the sequential and concurrent semantics.
Rule (THROWTO1) evaluates the thread identifier in term
throwTo t1 ξ, which reduces to throwTo t2 ξ through the
pure step t1  t2. (For simplicity, our model assumes that
exceptions are already evaluated in terms, thus the rules do
not need to reduce them). When the thread identifier is fully
evaluated, i.e., it is of the form TId` n , rule (THROWTO2)
generates event throw`(ξ,n) and returns unit. The rule reflects
the non-blocking behavior of throwTo, which always succeeds
as soon as the thread identifier is evaluated and regardless
of the state of the receiving thread. This design decision
has important security implications that we discuss further
in Section V-C. Rule (CATCH1) executes the computation
t1 in term catch t1 hs . If during the execution of t1 the
computation receives some exception ξ, and the exception
propagates up to the exception handler, then the term reduces
to catch (raise ξ) hs and rules (CATCHξ1) and (CATCHξ2)
determine whether the exception gets handled or not. In these
rules, function first(hs, ξ) searches for a handler corresponding
to exception ξ in the list hs . To do so, the function traverses
the list of exception-handler pairs hs left-to-right until it finds
a pair whose left component is equal to exception ξ. If a
handler for that exception is in the list, i.e., h = first(hs, ξ),
then (CATCHξ1) passes control to it. If no handler matches the
exception, i.e., ∅ = first(hs, ξ), then rule (CATCHξ2) simply
propagates the exception.
A. Masking Exceptions
Asynchronous exceptions are typically sent in response to
external events such as user interrupts and exceeding resource
limits. These exceptions can disrupt threads unpredictably,
at any moment during their execution, and end up breaking
code invariants and leaving shared data structures in an
inconsistent state. For example, an incoming exception may
crash a thread inside a critical section and cause it to hold a lock
indefinitely, without the possibility of cleaning up. Therefore,
writing robust code in the presence of asynchronous exceptions
requires a mechanism to temporarily suppress exceptions in
critical sections that must not be interrupted. Inspired by [27],
MACasync sports two scoped combinators, mask and unamsk ,
to disable and enable specific exceptions in a given code region,
respectively.7
mask :: χ→ MAC ` τ → MAC ` τ
unmask :: χ→ MAC ` τ → MAC ` τ
Intuitively, primitive mask ξ t runs computation t with
exceptions ξ disabled. If such an exception is received during
the execution of t , the exception is not dropped, but stored
in a buffer of pending exceptions ξs and raised once the
execution goes past the mask instruction. Term unmask ξ t
7Even though these primitives take only a single exception as an argument,
they are equivalent to the multi-exception variants used in Section III, i.e.,
mask [ξ1, ξ2 ] t behaves exactly like mask ξ1 (mask ξ2 t).
Exceptions: ξ
Events: e ::= · · · | throw`(ξ,n)
Values: v ::= · · · | raise ξ
Handlers: hs ::= [ ] | (ξ, t) : hs
Terms: t ::= · · · | throwTo t ξ | catch t hs
(THROWTO1)
t1  t2
Σ, throwTo t1 ξ
step−−−→φ Σ, throwTo t2 ξ
(THROWTO2)
Σ, throwTo (TId` n) ξ




Σ1, catch t1 hs
e−→φ Σ2, catch t2 hs
(CATCHξ1)
h = first(hs, ξ)
Σ, catch (raise ξ) hs
step−−−→φ Σ, h
(CATCHξ2)
∅ = first(hs, ξ)
Σ, catch (raise ξ) hs
step−−−→φ Σ, raise ξ
Fig. 10: Syntax and semantics for asynchronous exceptions.
works the other way around and enables exceptions ξ while
executing t . In general, whether an exception received by a
thread should be raised immediately or temporarily suppressed
depends on the masking context of the thread. Intuitively, the
masking context at each execution point depends on the (nested)
mask and unmask instructions crossed up to that point. For
instance, if program unmask ξ (mask ξ′ t) receives exception
ξ while executing t , and if ξ 6≡ ξ′ and t does not contain
any mask ξ instruction, then the exception gets raised, i.e.,
unmask ξ (mask ξ′ (· · · raise ξ · · · )).
Figure 11 presents the sequential semantics of mask and
unmask . The masking context M is a map from exceptions
to booleans, representing a bit vector that indicates which
exceptions can be raised in the reduction steps. To keep
track of exceptions, the sequential relation carries the list of
pending exceptions ξs, on the left, and the list of remaining
exceptions ξ′s on the right of the arrow. Further, the arrow
is annotated with the masking context of the thread (M ).
Rules (MASK) and (UNMASK) modify the masking context
accordingly via functions mask(M , ξ) = λξ′.ξ ≡ ξ′ ∨ M (ξ′)
and unmask(M , ξ) (analogous). In particular, the rules reduce
term mask ξ t (respectively unmask ξ t) by executing term
t with modified mask M2 obtained from disabling (enabling)
exception ξ in the current mask M1, i.e., M2 = mask(M1, ξ)
(M2 = unmask(M1, ξ)). When a nested, masked computation
has completed, either successfully (return t) or not (raise ξ′),
rules (MASK1) and (MASKξ) simply propagate the result.
Mask: M ∈ χ→ Bool
Terms: t ::= · · · | mask ξ t | unmask ξ t
Exception list: ξs ::= [ ] | (ξ : ξs)
(MASK)
M2 = mask(M1, ξ) Σ1, t1, ξs
e−→(φ,M2) Σ2, t2 ξ
′
s
Σ1,mask ξ t1, ξs




M2 = unmask(M1, ξ) Σ1, t1, ξs
e−→(φ,M2) Σ2, t2, ξ
′
s
Σ1, unmask ξ t1, ξs




Σ,mask ξ (return t), ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, return t , ξs
(MASKξ)
Σ,mask ξ (raise ξ′), ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, raise ξ′, ξs
Fig. 11: Syntax and semantics of mask (unmask is similar).
(BIND-RAISE)
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = (ξ, ξ
′
s)
Σ, return t1 >>= t2, ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, raise ξ, ξ′s
(BIND2)
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅
Σ, return t1 >>= t2, ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, t2 t1, ξs
(BINDξ)
Σ, raise ξ >>= t , ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, raise ξ, ξs
Fig. 12: Masking semantics of bind (>>=).
The masking context M and the list of pending exceptions
ξs determine whether any exception in the list should be
raised or not. To reflect that, we need to adapt the semantics
rules for most constructs of the calculus. Figure 12 shows the
modifications for the monadic bind (>>=). (The rules for the
other constructs are modified in a similar way, we refer the
reader to the Agda mechanization for details).
First, we define function unmaskedξ′s(M , ξs), which extracts
from the list of pending exceptions ξs the first exception ξ that
is unmasked in M , i.e., such that ¬ M (ξ), The function walks
down the list recursively and accumulates the exceptions ξ that
are masked in M , i.e., such that M (ξ), in the list ξ′s, which
is then returned together with the rest of the list ξs, when an
unmasked exception is found. If all the exceptions in the list
are masked, the function simply returns ∅.
unmaskedξ′s(M , ξs) =
∅ if ξs = [ ]
(ξ, ξ′s ++ ξ
′′
s ) if ξs = ξ : ξ
′′
s and ¬ M (ξ)
unmasked(ξ′s+ [ξ ])(M , ξ
′′
s ) if ξs = ξ : ξ
′′
s and M (ξ)
(TAKE1)
(`,n) 7→ L t M ∈ Σ
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅ Σ′ = Σ[(`,n) 7→ ⊗]
Σ, takeMVar (MVar ` n), ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ′, return t , ξs
(TAKE-RAISE-UNMASKED)
(`,n) 7→ c ∈ Σ unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = (ξ, ξ′s)
Σ, takeMVar (MVar ` n), ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, raise ξ, ξ′s
(TAKE-RAISE-MASKED)
(`,n) 7→ ⊗ ∈ Σ
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅ ξs = ξ : ξ′s
Σ, takeMVar (MVar ` n), ξs
step−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, raise ξ, ξ′s
Fig. 13: Synchronization variables and exceptions.
In the elimination rules of the semantics, we apply function
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) to determine whether a pending exception
should be raised. For example, if all exceptions are masked,
i.e., unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅, then rule (BIND2) steps as
usual. In contrast, if an unmasked exception is pending, i.e.,
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = (ξ, ξ
′
s), rule (BIND-RAISE) raises it, i.e.,
raise ξ, and the thread steps with buffer ξ′s where exception ξ
has been removed.
Once raised, exceptions propagate unconditionally via rule
(BINDξ), i.e., no further exceptions are raised until the current
one is handled.
B. Concurrency and Synchronization Variables
The modifications needed for supporting asynchronous
exceptions in the concurrent semantics are minimal. Figure 14
extends the thread state th with the list of pending exceptions
ξs and the initial masking context M . When a thread forks,
the child thread inherits the masking context of the parent
thread and runs with an initially empty list of exceptions. New
rule (THROW) processes event throw`′(ξ,n ′) by delivering
exception ξ to the thread (t , ξ′s,M
′) identified by (`′,n ′). Since
exceptions are processed in the same order as they are delivered,
the rule inserts ξ at the end of the buffer ξ′s, i.e., ξ
′
s ++ [ξ ].
Next, we introduce new rules that capture precisely the
interaction between synchronization variables and asynchronous
exceptions. As we explained before, Concurrent Haskell by
design allows specific blocking operations to be interrupted
by asynchronous exceptions, even if they are masked [27].
Therefore, our semantics resumes threads stuck on synchro-
nization variables if any exception is pending. The rules in
Figure 13 formalize this requirement for primitive takeMVar ,
the rules for putMVar are symmetric. Rule (TAKE1) covers
the case where no unmasked exception is pending, i.e.,
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅, and the thread can step because
the variable is full, i.e., (`,n) 7→ L t M ∈ Σ, and
thus the rule returns its content t and empties the variable,
i.e., Σ[(`,n) 7→ ⊗]. On the other hand, in rule (TAKE-
RAISE-UNMASKED), an unmasked exception is pending, i.e.,
unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = (ξ, ξ
′
s), thus, regardless of the variable
being full or empty, i.e., (`,n) 7→ c ∈ Σ, the rule aborts the
computation and raises the exception ξ without modifying the
store. Lastly, in rule (TAKE-RAISE-MASKED), the variable is
empty, i.e., (`,n) 7→ ⊗ ∈ Σ, and the thread should block
and get stuck. However, an exception ξ is pending in the
buffer ξs, i.e., ξs = ξ :ξ′s, therefore—regardless of the masking
context M—the thread is resumed by raising exception ξ. In
the rule, the condition unmasked[ ](M , ξs) = ∅ reveals that the
pending exception that gets raised is masked and ensures that
the semantics is deterministic. Without this premise, a thread
with both unmasked and masked exceptions pending in its
buffer could either step via rule (TAKE-RAISE-UNMASKED)
and raise the first unmasked exception, or via rule (TAKE-
RAISE-MASKED) and raise the first masked exception. The
condition above removes the non-determinism: if both masked
and unmasked exceptions are pending, the first unmasked
exception is raised via rule (TAKE-RAISE-UNMASKED).
C. Design Choices and Security
In this part we motivate some of the design choices that
are key to the security guarantees of MACasync and that, we
believe, can help programmers to write code that is more robust
to asynchronous exceptions.
a) API of throwTo: The type of throwTo (Fig. 9)
restricts how threads are permitted to communicate asyn-
chronously with each other to enforce security. Imagine an
unrestricted version of throwTo called throwToleaky, which—
in clear violation of the no write-down security rule—allows
secret threads to send exceptions to public threads. If MACasync
exposed this leaky primitive, then an attacker could exploit it
to leak secret data to a public thread through classic implicit
flows attacks:
do tidL ← forkL (do catch loop [(ξ, printL 1)])
← forkH (do s← unlabel secret
if s then throwToleaky tidL ξ
else return ())
The code above forks two threads, a public thread that waits
for an asynchronous exception in a loop, and a secret thread
that branches on secret data and sends an exception to the
public thread in one branch. Since the secret thread sends an
exception to the public thread only when the secret is true,
the attacker can easily learn its value by simply monitoring
the public output of the public thread, which prints 1 only
when an exception is raised. MACasync rejects such attacks
by statically enforcing the no write-down rule in the API of
throwTo, which would make the code above ill-typed.
b) Asynchronous throwTo: In MACasync, primitive
throwTo is itself an asynchronous operation. As rule
(THROWTO2) in Figure 10 shows, primitive throwTo always
returns immediately, without waiting for the receiver thread
to raise the exception. This design choice follows a previous
line of work on asynchronous exceptions for Haskell [27],
where the authors argue that the asynchronous semantics is
easier to implement. Maybe surprisingly, the current imple-
mentation of Concurrent Haskell with asynchronous exception





′)−−−−−−−−−→(φ,M ) Σ, t2, ξs Θ2 = Θ1[(`,n) 7→ (t2, ξs,M )] (`′,n ′) 7→ (t , ξ′s,M ′) ∈ Θ2
`,n ` 〈Σ,Θ1[(`,n) 7→ (t1, ξs,M )]〉 ↪→ 〈Σ,Θ2[(`′,n ′) 7→ (t , ξ′s ++ [ξ ],M ′)]〉
Fig. 14: Extended concurrent semantics for asynchronous exceptions.
in the GHC runtime provides only a synchronous version
of throwTo.8 Would MACasyncbe secure with a synchronous
primitive throwTosync? No, unfortunately the possibility of
two threads synchronizing by throwing exceptions opens a
new covert channel. Consider the following example, where
throwTosync has synchronous semantics, i.e., throwTosync
blocks the sender thread until the exception is raised in the
receiver thread.
do tidH ← forkH (do s← unlabel secret




In the code above, the main public thread forks a secret thread,
which branches on secret data and in one branch enters the
masked block mask ξ loop. After waiting for a sufficient
amount of time through no_ops , the public thread sends
exception ξ synchronously to the secret thread. If the secret
thread is looping in the masked block, the exception ξ will
never be raised, causing the public thread to block forever
on throwTosync and thus suppressing the final public output
printL 0. Then, the attacker can learn the value of the secret
by simply observing (the lack of) the output 0 on the public
channel.
As discussed in Section II for MVar , synchronous com-
munication primitives perform both read and write side-
effects, therefore throwTosync cannot operate securely between
threads at different security levels. Even though Concurrent
Haskell provides only the equivalent of throwTosync, we
can still derive a secure asynchronous implementation for
throwTo by internally forking an isolated thread that calls
the unsafe throwTosync, i.e., we define throwTo t ξ as
fork (throwTosync t ξ  return ()).
c) Reliable exception delivery: In MACasync, threads store
the received exceptions in the buffer where they remain until
raised. Importantly, the exceptions are raised following the
order in which they have been delivered, thus enabling threads
to react to signals in the same order as they arise. Even though
multiple exceptions can be pending in the buffer, our semantics
ensures that new exceptions are not raised while the thread
is in an exceptional state. This choice eliminates, by design,
the risk of multiple simultaneous exceptions disrupting critical
code in unpredictable ways. Once handled via the matching
8https://hackage.haskell.org/package/base-4.12.0.0/docs/Control-Exception.
html#v:throwTo
exception handler, the code resumes normal execution and any
other pending exception may be raised. This ensures that all
remaining exceptions, if not masked, will eventually be raised.
D. Relation to MAC
MACasync extends MAC with asynchronous exceptions [23].
MAC features exception-handling primitives and classic ex-
ceptions, but these operate within individual threads and are
intended to signal and recover from exceptional conditions aris-
ing only internally, due to the current state of the computation.
Asynchronous exceptions are more expressive than regular
exceptions. In addition to signaling (external) exceptional
conditions, they enable a flexible signal-based communication
mechanism. In MAC, threads can communicate with each other
only synchronously and indirectly, through synchronization
variables. Though possible, this communication mechanism is
too cumbersome to use as it would require programmers to
establish an appropriate communication protocol and change
their code heavily, for example to ensure that all threads that
need communicating share the same synchronization variable.
Even worse, communication in this style is limited between
threads at the same security level. In contrast, threads in
MACasync can communicate directly, by sending exceptions
to the identifier of the intended receiver thread, and also to
threads at a different, more sensitive security level. MACasync
leverages the mechanization of MAC in its security proofs.
Modeling the semantics of asynchronous exceptions presented
in this paper required substantial changes to the existing artifact.
These changes include extending the syntax and semantics of
the previous model with our new primitives, as well as carefully
adapting the existing semantics rules to capture the semantics
of interruptible exceptions.
VI. SECURITY GUARANTEES
This section shows that MACasync satisfies progress-sensitive
non-interference (PSNI). We begin by describing our proof
technique based on term erasure. Then, we present two lemmas
that are key to the progress-sensitive guarantees of the calculus
and sketch the non-interference proof. We refer the interested
reader to the Agda mechanization for detailed proofs.
A. Term Erasure
Term erasure is a widely used technique to prove non-
interference properties of IFC languages (e.g. [23, 26, 30,
34, 37, 38, 39]). The technique takes its name from the
erasure function, which removes secret data syntactically from





Fig. 15: Single-step simulation.
rewrites the sub-terms of t above the attacker’s security level
`A to special term •, which only reduces to itself. Once this
function is defined, the technique relies on establishing a core
property, a simulation between the execution of terms (and
later configurations as well) and their erased counterpart. The
simulation diagram in Figure 15 illustrates this property for
pure terms. The diagram shows that erasing the confidential
parts of term t and then reducing the erased term ε`A(t) along
the orange path leads to the same term ε`A(t
′) obtained along
the cyan path by first stepping from term t to term t ′ and
then applying erasure, i.e., the diagram commutes. Intuitively,
if term t leaked while stepping to t ′, then some data above
security level `A would remain in the erased term ε`A(t
′), but it
would be erased along the other path, in which t is first erased
and then reduced, and thus the diagram would not commute.
B. Erasure Function
We define the erasure function for terms in Figure 16. Since
the sensitivity of many terms is determined by their type, the
definition of the erasure function is type driven, i.e., we write
ε`A(t :: τ) for the erasure of term t of type τ . (We omit the
type of the term when it is irrelevant). Ground values are
unaffected by the erasure function, e.g., ε`A(()) = (), and
most terms are erased homomorphically, e.g., ε`A(t1 t2) =
ε`A(t1) ε`A(t2). The content of secret labeled values is removed,
i.e., ε`A(Labeled t :: Labeled ` t) = Labeled • if ` 6v `A,
or erased homomorphically otherwise, i.e., ε`A(Labeled t ::
Labeled ` t) = Labeled ε`A(t : τ) if ` v `A. Notice that
terms of type MAC ` τ (e.g., mask , unmask ) are also erased
homomorphically, despite the fact that the computation may
be sensitive, i.e., even if ` 6v `A. (The special erasure for
primitive throwTo is explained below). Should not erasure
rewrite these constructs to • ? Intuitively, these terms represent
a description of a sensitive computation, which cannot leak data
until it is inserted in a sequential configuration and executed.
Since these terms can only execute when fetched from a thread
pool, it is then sufficient to erase thread pools appropriately.
We define the erasure function for configurations, stores,
thread pools, and thread states in Figure 17. Configurations are
erased component-wise, i.e., ε`A(〈Σ,Θ〉) = 〈ε`A(Σ), ε`A(Θ)〉.
Thread pools Θ containing secret threads are entirely removed
by the erasure function, i.e., ε`A(Θ)(`) = • if ` 6v `A, while
those containing thread pools are erased homomorphically,
i.e., ε`A(Θ)(`) = ε`A(Θ(`)) if ` v `A, where ε`A([ ]) = [ ]
and ε`A(th, Ts) = (ε`A(th), ε`A(Ts)). (The erasure function
for memory stores and segments is similar). When some
secret thread gets scheduled from an erased thread pool •,
a dummy thread (•, [ ], λ .False) runs instead and simply
ε`A(()) = ()
ε`A(t1 t2) = ε`A(t1) ε`A(t2)
ε`A(Labeled t :: Labeled ` t)
=
{
Labeled ε`A(t) if `H v `A
Labeled • otherwise
ε`A(mask ξ t) = mask ξ ε`A(t)
ε`A(unmask ξ t) = unmask ξ ε`A(t)
ε`A(throwTo (t :: TId `H) ξ :: MAC `L ())
=
{
throwTo ε`A(t) ξ if `H v `A
throwTo• ε`A(t) ξ otherwise
Fig. 16: Erasure of terms (excerpts).
ε`A(〈Σ,Θ〉) = 〈ε`A(Σ), ε`A(Θ)〉
ε`A(Σ)(`) =
{




ε`A(Ts) if ` v `A and Ts = Θ(`)
• otherwise
ε`A((t , ξs,M )) = (ε`A(t), ξs,M )
Fig. 17: Erasure of configurations (excerpts)
loops. However, rewriting secret thread pools to • can disrupt
operations involving thread identifiers. For example, an erased
public thread using primitive throwTo to communicate with
a secret thread gets stuck, since rule (THROW) would try to
deliver an exception into thread pool •. To recover from this
situation, we apply the two-step erasure technique [30]. This
technique rewrites problematic terms, e.g., throwTo, to special,
•-annotated erased terms added to the calculus, i.e., throwTo•.
The semantics of these new terms is then defined precisely
to re-establish the core simulation property fundamental for
security (Fig. 15). For example, term throwTo• t ξ reduces just
like thorwTo in rules (THROWTO1) and (THROWTO2), thus
respecting the simulation property of the sequential semantics.
However, instead of generating a regular event throw`H(ξ,n),
which would get the concurrent configuration stuck in rule
(THROW), it generates a new event throw•`H(ξ). Similarly,
this event is handled by a new rule of the concurrent semantics,
which simply drops the exception (no thread labeled `H 6v `A
can receive it), thus completing the simulation diagram of the
concurrent step (THROW).
C. Progress-Sensitive Non-Interference
The proof of progress-sensitive non-interference builds on
two key properties of the concurrent relation: deterministic
reduction and erased simulation.
Lemma 1 (Deterministic Reduction). If c1 ↪→ c2 and c1 ↪→ c3,
then c2 ≡ c3.
The symbol ≡ above denotes syntactic equality up to α-
renaming, in our mechanized proofs we use De Bruijn indexes
and syntactic equality. Determinism of the concurrent semantics
is important for security, because it eliminates scheduler
refinement attacks [13].
The second lemma that we prove relates the reduction step
of a thread in the concurrent semantics with the corresponding
erased thread. If the security level ` of the thread is below the
level of the attacker, i.e. ` v `A, then we construct a simulation
diagram similar to that of Figure 15, but for concurrent steps.
Instead, if the security level of the thread is not observable
by the attacker, i.e., ` 6v `A, then the configurations before
and after the step are indistinguishable to the attacker. This
indistinguishability relation is called `A-equivalence, written
c1 ≈`A c2, and defined as the kernel of the erasure function
(Fig. 17), i.e., ε`A(c1) ≡ ε`A(c2).
Lemma 2 (Erased Simulation). Given a concurrent reduction
step `,n ` c1 ↪→ c′1 then
• `,n ` ε`A(c1) ↪→ ε`A(c′1), if ` v `A, or
• c1 ≈`A c′1, if ` 6v `A
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we prove progress-sensitive non-
interference (PSNI), where symbol ↪→∗ denotes the transitive
reflexive closure of ↪→ as usual.
Theorem 1 (Progress-Sensitive Non-Interference). Given two
well-typed concurrent configurations c1 and c2, such that
c1 ≈`A c2, and a reduction step `,n ` c1 ↪→ c′1, then there
exists a configuration c′2 such that c
′
1 ≈`A c′2 and c2 ↪→∗ c′2.
Proof. By cases on ` v `A.
If ` v `A then in the configuration c2 there is an `A-
equivalent thread identified by (`,n). Before that thread runs,
however, there can be a finite number of high threads in
c2 scheduled before (`,n). After the high threads run, i.e.
c2 ↪→∗ c′′2 , for some configuration c′′2 , the low thread is
scheduled again, i.e. `,n ` c′′2 ↪→ c′2, for some other
configuration c′2. From Lemma 2 (erased simulation) applied to
the first set of steps, we obtain c2 ≈`A c′′2 (all these steps involve
threads above the attacker’s level) and then c1 ≈`A c′′2 follows
by transitivity of the `A-equivalence relation. Then, we apply
Lemma 2 again and conclude that `,n ` ε`A(c′′2 ) ↪→ ε`A(c′2),
since ` v `A as well as `,n ` ε`A(c1) ↪→ ε`A(c′1). By
definition of `A-equivalence, we derive ε`A(c1) ≡ ε`A(c′′2 ) from
c1 ≈`A c′′2 and from Lemma 1 (determinancy) we conclude that
ε`A(c
′
1) ≡ ε`A(c′2), i.e., c′1 ≈`A c′2.
If ` 6v `A, then we apply Lemma 2 and obtain c1 ≈`A c′1,
thus c′1 ≈`A c′2 for c′2 = c2 by reflexivity and transitivity of
`A-equivalence.
VII. RELATED WORK
Asynchronous Exceptions Mechanisms. Asynchronous excep-
tions and signals allow developers to implement key function-
alities of real-world systems (e.g., speculative computation,
timeouts, user interrupts, and enforcing resources bounds)
robustly [27, 40]. Surprisingly, support for asynchronous excep-
tions in concurrent programming languages differ considerably.
For example, Java has deprecated fully asynchronous methods
to stop, suspend, and resume threads because they can too
easily break programs invariants without hope of recovery [21].
Similarly, the interaction between synchronous exceptions
and signals makes it hard to write robust signal handlers
in Python [20]. Lacking robust asynchronous primitives,
several programming languages and operating systems (e.g.,
Java, Modula-3, and POSIX-compliant OS’es) rely on semi-
asynchronous communication as a workaround. With this
approach, a thread sends a signal to another by setting special
flags that must be polled periodically by the receiver. Even
though programming in this model is less convenient, we
believe that the principles proposed in this paper could be
adapted for semi-asynchronous communication. The Standard
ML of New Jersey (SML/NJ) features asynchronous signaling
mechanisms based on first-class continuations [28]. When a
thread receives a signal, control is passed to the corresponding
handler together with the interrupted state of the thread as
a continuation. Then, the handler may decide to resume the
execution of the interrupted thread or pass control to another
thread. Erlang implements a special kind of asynchronous
signaling. Threads can monitor each other through bidirectional
links, which propagate the exit code of a thread to the
other [41]. Multicore OCaml support asynchronous exceptions
through algebraic effects and effects handlers [42]. Syme et al.
[43] extend F# with an asynchronous modality that changes
the semantics of control-flow operators to use continuations,
thus sparing programmers from writing asynchronous code
in continuation-passing style. Bierman et al. [44] port this
approach to C# and additionally formalize it with a direct
operational semantics and prove type-safety. Inoue et al. [45]
provide interruptible executions in Scala for context-aware
(reactive) programming via an embedded domain specific
language based on workflows. Concurrent Haskell supports
asynchronous exceptions with scoped (un)masking combinators
[27] and MACasync relies on them to provide secure API to
untrusted code.
Semantics of Asynchronous Exceptions. Peyton Jones et al.
[46] present a semantics framework for reasoning about
the correctness of compiler optimizations in the presence
of (imprecise) exceptions for Haskell. Their framework can
capture asynchronous exceptions as well, but it is based on
denotational semantics and thus not suitable for reasoning
about covert channels. Marlow et al. [27] were the first to
develop an operational semantics for asynchronous exceptions,
which inspired ours and which we have extended to model
fine-grained exception handlers. Their semantics is based on
evaluation contexts [47], while ours is small-step to leverage the
existing formalization and mechanization of MAC [15, 23, 30].
Hutton and Wright [48] study an operational semantics for
interrupts in the context of a basic terminating language without
concurrency and I/O. Their goal is exploratory: they want to
formally justify the source level semantics with respect to
its compilation to a low-level language. Harrison et al. [49]
identify asynchronous exceptions as a computational effect and
formalize them in a modular monadic model.
Covert Channels and Countermeasures. Several runtime
system features create subtle covert channels that weaken and
sometimes completely break the security guarantees of IFC
languages. When memory is shared between computations
at different security levels, garbage collection cycles leak
information via timing, even across network connections [10].
To close this channel, memory should be partitioned by
security level and each memory partition should be managed
by an independent timing-sensitive garbage collector (see
the garbage collector implemented in Zee for an example
[12]). Lazy evaluation introduces a software level cache in
the runtime system which creates an internal timing channel
in concurrent Haskell IFC libraries [9]. To close this channel,
Vassena et al. [15] design a runtime system primitive that
restricts sharing between threads at different security levels.
The same primitive can close the lazy covert channel in
MACasync. General purpose runtime system automatically
balance computing resources (CPU time, memory and cores)
between running threads to achieve fairness, but, by doing so on
multi-core systems, they also internalize many external timing
covert channels [11]. LIOPAR is a runtime system design that
recovers security in multi-core systems by making resource
management hierarchical and explicit at the programming
language level. Even though in LIOPAR parent threads send
asynchronous signals to kill children and reclaim computing
resources, LIOPAR does not support fine-grained exception
handlers and masking primitives. Language-based predictive
mitigation is a general technique to bound the leakage of
timing-channels (e.g., arising due to hardware caches) in
programs [50]. Jérémy and Aslan [51] optimize this technique
for a sequential programming language with asynchronous
I/O, but their approach does not consider concurrency and
asynchronous exceptions. Interruptible enclaves have been the
target of several attacks interrupt-based attacks [52, 53, 54] and
Busi et al. [55] propose full abstraction [56] as the desirable
security criterion for extending processor with interruptible
enclaves securely. Our security criterion (progress-sensitive non-
interference) is simpler to prove and aligns with the expected
security guarantees of MACasync. Intuitively, Busi et al. [55]
prove a more complex criterion because it ensures that the
extended processor has no more vulnerabilities than the original,
but that does not imply that neither processor satisfies some
specific security property.
Secure Runtime Systems and Abstractions. Systems that by
design run untrusted programs (e.g., mobile code and plug-ins)
must place adequate security mechanisms to impede buggy
or malicious code from exhausting all available computing
resources. KaffeOS is an extension of the Java runtime system
that isolates processes and manage their computing resources
(memory and CPU time) to prevent abuse [57]. When a
process exceeds its resource budget, KaffeOS kills it and
reclaims its resources without affecting the integrity of the
system. Cinder is an operating system for mobile devices
that provides reserves and taps abstractions for storing and
distributing energy [58]. Using these abstractions, applications
can delegate and subdivide their energy quota while maintaining
energy isolation. Yang and Mazières [59] extend GHC runtime
systems with resource containers, an abstraction that enforce
dynamic space limits according to an allocator-pays semantics.
None of these systems enforce information flow policies except
for Cinder, but we believe that secure API for asynchronous
exceptions like those of MACasync could represent a basic
building block to enforce them reliably.
Zee is an IFC language for implementing secure (timing-
sensitive) runtime systems [12]. The lack of asynchronous
exceptions in Zee complicates the implementation of certain
runtime system components, but we believe that Zee could
support them by applying the insights from this work. An
interesting line of work aims at exposing safe high-level API
to allow users to reprogram features of the runtime systems,
e.g., concurrency primitives [17], multi-core schedulers [18],
and kill-safe abstractions [19]. We believe that the primitives
designed to remove covert channels in GHC and other runtime
systems discussed above could be implemented following this
approach.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work presents the first IFC language that support
asynchronous exceptions securely. Embedded in Haskell, the
IFC library MACasync provides primitives for fine-grained
masking and unmasking of asynchronous exceptions, which
enable useful programming patterns, that we showcased with
two examples. We have formalized MACasync in 3,000 lines
of Agda and proved progress-sensitive non-interference.
As future work, we plan to use MACasync to reason about
the delivery of OS signals to threads. Specially, we will explore
OS signals dedicated to alert about exhaustion of resources that
cannot be easily partitioned (e.g., the battery in an IoT board).
This scenario will demand the OS—which can be thought as
just another thread—to send signals from higher to lower levels
in the security lattice, thus opening up an information leakage
channel which, we believe, needs to be mitigated.
Another direction for future work consists on using
MACasync to build realistic systems. For instance, we expect
MACasync to be able to provide an IFC-aware interface for
GHC to control CPU usage by leveraging on previous work
[17, 18]. Moreover, building realistic systems often involves
mutually distrusts principals, where we expect privileges
[60, 61] to restrict untrusted code from abusing our selective
mask mechanism.
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